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Long Term Issues for Clinical Laboratories
(Presented at last CLIAC meeting November 2014)
• How to assure that 
clinical laboratories 
are prepared for 
biological threats and 
emerging infectious  
diseases?
• How to assure the 
safety of laboratory 
instruments?
• How to assure 
compliance with 
standard laboratory 
precautions and the 
OSHA bloodborne 
standard?
• Who inspects 
laboratories for safety?
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Laboratory Safety Gaps Identified During 
Rapid Ebola Preparedness (REP) Team Visits to 
US Hospitals 
 October 2014-January 2015: CDC REP teams 
evaluated 55 hospitals for their capacity and 
preparedness to receive, identify and treat patients 
with suspected or confirmed Ebola virus disease
 Results: 
• Assumptions about laboratory safety and operations 
were being made but were not necessarily true
• The safety gaps identified, present an opportunity to 
educate and improve safety and operations
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Some Common Gaps in Laboratory Safety 
Identified
 Laboratory staff were not always conducting risk 
assessments, following OSHA’s  blood borne 
pathogens standard, or implementing safe work 
practices
 Laboratory instruments were not necessarily safe for 
operators
 Lack of communication between lab and clinical care
 Insufficient training in work practices and personal 
protective equipment (PPE) leading to:
o fear and lack of confidence among staff
o reluctance to test patient specimens
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Problems Identified with Routine Testing of Persons 
Under Investigation (PUIs) in Clinical Laboratories-
which led to more fear
 Lack of data on safety of routine clinical laboratory 
procedures for Ebola specimens
 Some professional organizations recommended that 
laboratories limit testing in their regular clinical laboratories 
on PUIs for Ebola
 Some national reference laboratories requested that clients 
not submit specimens from PUIs for Ebola
• “Any laboratory testing requested on specimens from 
suspected Ebola patients should not be sent …… but held 
until results for Ebola testing are confirmed as negative by 
the CDC.”
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How to assure that clinical laboratories are prepared 
for biological threats and emerging infectious  
diseases?
 Raise awareness of Laboratory Director responsibilities for 
providing a safe environment in which employees are 
protected from physical, chemical and biological hazards 
(CLIA regulations; 42 CFR Part 493.1407(e)(2) and 1445(e)(2)
• How?
 Training and education of laboratory professionals to 
increase knowledge, skills and abilities necessary to ensure a 
safe working environment to include but not limited to;
• Risk assessment 
• Personal protective equipment (PPE)
• Safe work practices,  including biosafety cabinets (BSC) 
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Risk assessment is the basis 
of a safety program
 Responsible persons (Lab Director, biosafety officer, 
lab supervisor)  should conduct risk assessments to :
• Determine potential for sprays, splashes, or aerosols
• Adjust engineering controls, work practices, or personal 
protective equipment to protect skin, eyes, mucous 
membranes
 Risk assessments are not always performed due to 
lack of knowledge
• How to do risk assessment?
• Who to involve? Industrial hygienist,  biomechanical 
engineering department, infection preventionist?
• Lack of data and evidence base, or other reasons?    
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Risk assessment is the basis 
of a safety program
Risk Assessment is a process to:
• identify the hazards (agent, procedures and 
staff)
• evaluate the risks
• determine controls
• implement controls 
• evaluate/review 
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Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
• Is it appropriate for the activity? It depends on the 
risk assessment
• PPE will vary depending on:
owhat is being done (activities)
owhere it is being done (lab vs. patient room)
ocapabilities of the user
• Removing PPE is a risk-where, how, what 
sequence?
• Are staff trained and comfortable?
• Have they practiced procedures with PPE on?
11
PPE
 More is not always better-
• Limited visibility, mobility and potential heat stress
• Ill-fitting PPE can cause distraction and reduced sensory 
perception
• Distraction can compromise safety
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Proper Use of Biosafety Cabinet (BSC)
• Load cabinet only with 
necessary equipment 
and supplies
• Do not cover the 
grilles 
• Move arms slowly and 
deliberately
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Improper Use of Biosafety Cabinet
 BSCs have very specific airflow patterns
 Crowded BSC can interrupt proper airflow and compromise  
operator safety, seen on REP visits 
• Infectious particles can be pushed out into the breathing zone of 
operator
• Front grilles are covered, too much equipment inside
 Staff must be trained on how to move in and out safely 
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Problems Identified with Routine Testing of Persons 
Under Investigation in Clinical Laboratories 3
• No organization 
evaluates or approves 
clinical laboratory 
instruments for safety
• Lack of data on 
decontamination of 
automated laboratory 
instruments, racks, and 
plates
• Liquid waste disposal 
from instruments-open 
containers and released 
directly to drain  
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Problems Identified with Routine Testing of Persons 
Under Investigation in Clinical Laboratories 2
• Some instrument 
manufacturers have 
informed users that 
testing Ebola 
specimens would void 
warranties or prevent 
reuse of the instrument
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GUIDELINES FOR SAFE WORK PRACTICES IN 
HUMAN AND ANIMAL MEDICAL 
DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORIES
Recommendations of a CDC-convened Blue Ribbon Panel 
MMWR Supplement/Vol. 61, January 6, 2012
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su6101a1.htm
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MMWR Blue Ribbon Biosafety Panel; List of 
Potential Aerosol and Droplet Generating 
Procedures 
• Manipulating needles, syringes and sharps
• Manipulating inoculation needles, loops, 
pipettes 
• Manipulating tissue and fluid specimens 
and cultures 
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Aerosols and Droplet Generation
 Procedures that impart energy to a microbial 
suspension
 Ubiquitous in laboratory procedures
 Usually undetected
 Thought to be major cause of laboratory acquired 
infections (LAIs)
Mixing test tube contents on a vortex Extracting blood from a bottle
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2007 GUIDELINE FOR ISOLATION 
PRECAUTIONS: PREVENTING TRANSMISSION 
OF INFECTIOUS AGENTS IN HEALTHCARE 
SETTINGS
From the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory 
Committee (HICPAC) 
http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/isolation/Isolation2007.pdf
These guidelines are based on literature review and an 
“evidence base” collected over time 
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PRIMARY ROUTES OF INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE TRANSMISSION 




 Direct: microorganisms are transferred from one infected 
person to other person without a contaminated 
intermediate object or person through non-intact skin (cuts, 
abrasions, dermatitis, chapped skin, scratches etc.)
 Indirect: transfer of infectious agent through a contaminated 
intermediate object or person (hands of Healthcare 
personnel, patient care devices such as thermometers, 
stethoscopes, shared toys, inadequately cleaned 
instruments, soiled garments or surgical gowns)
http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/isolation/Isolation2007.pdf
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Examples of Agents Which Are Mainly 
Transmitted via Contact




 C. difficile 
 And others as well as infectious agents which have 




 A form of contact transmission with the addition of 
respiratory droplets traveling directly from the respiratory 
tract of the infected person to susceptible mucosal surfaces 
of the recipient; eyes/conjunctiva, nasal mucosa and mouth 
 Traditionally Droplet size considered > 5 um 
 Respiratory droplets occur when talking, coughing, sneezing 
or during procedures such as tracheal suctioning, 
endotracheal intubation
 Organisms transmitted by the droplet route do not remain 
infective over long distances and therefore do not require 
special air handling and ventilation
http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/isolation/Isolation2007.pdf
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Respiratory Droplet Production During 
Sneezing
Public Health Image Library; phil.cdc.gov
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Droplet Transmission 2
 Maximum distance for droplet transmission is currently 
unresolved, more studies are needed
 Generally travel of droplets through air over short distances 
• Historically thought to be < or = to 3 feet 
• Specific studies of SARS and Smallpox, 6 foot distance
 A distance of 3 feet around patient is an example of a short 
distance but is not sole criterion for deciding when to wear a 
mask
 In general a prudent choice may be to wear a mask when 6 
to 10 feet from the patient. Esp. if exposure to highly 
virulent pathogens likely 
http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/isolation/Isolation2007.pdf
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Examples of Infectious Agents Transmitted via 
Droplets
 B. pertussis 




 SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
 group A strep 
 N. meningitidis
 RSV is “droplet plus contact” but contact is more common 




 Very small particles “droplet nuclei” remain infectious and  
suspended in air for extended periods of time
 Suspended Droplet nuclei undergo desiccation and air 
currents can disperse droplet nuclei over distances 
 When inhaled they enter respiratory tract and can cause 
infection 
 Only occurs with infectious agents which are capable of 
surviving and retaining infectivity for relatively long periods 
of time
 Can be inhaled by susceptible individuals who have not face 





 “Droplet nuclei” size traditionally defined as < or = 5 um 
based on Tuberculosis pathogenesis however not 
generalizable to other infectious diseases with airborne 
route of transmission
 Observations of particle dynamics reveal that droplets 
of 30 um can also float in the air for periods of time 
 NIOSH certified N95 masks or higher level respirator is 
recommended 
 Negative air flow rooms required to contain and 
remove the infectious agent
• Patient is placed under Airborne precautions in a 
airborne infection isolation room (AIIR)    
http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/isolation/Isolation2007.pdf
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Examples of Infectious Agents Transmitted via 
Airborne Transmission 
 Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
 Rubeola virus (measles) 
 Varicella zoster virus (chickenpox)
 Variola virus (smallpox) published data suggests possibility 
that may be transmitted over long distances through air 
under unusual circumstances however contact and droplet 
are the more frequent routes of transmission
 Questions and issues concerning short distance airborne 
transmission with SARS, monkey pox, avian influenza, 
endotracheal intubation, vomitus and fecal material
http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/isolation/Isolation2007.pdf
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List of Occupational Health Infectious Diseases and 
Routes of Exposure 
 Routinely transmitted by contact or body-fluid exposures: 
hepatitis B, hepatitis C, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
infection, rabies, vaccinia (Ebola)
 Routinely transmitted through aerosolized
airborne means: measles, tuberculosis, and varicella disease
 Routinely transmitted through aerosolized
droplet means: avian influenza, diphtheria, meningococcal 
disease, mumps, pneumonic




How To Assure the Safety Of Laboratory 
Instruments
 Design of instruments to keep operator safe
• Need closed instrument systems and/or engineering 
controls to contain aerosols generated by manipulation 
of patient specimens
o Collaborate with FDA and Manufacturers?
 Liquid waste generated by instruments needs to be disposed 
of safely in order to avoid human exposure 
• Collaborate with FDA and Manufacturers and EPA?
 Decontamination of instruments needs to be adequate and 
considered as part of the design of the instrument
• CDC is aware of the challenges that laboratories and their 
institutions face when decontamination instructions are not 
provided in the operator’s manuals and is in consultation with 
FDA and the manufacturers to resolve these issues
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How To Monitor, Evaluate  and Assure 
Continuous Improvement in Laboratory Safety?
 Training and Education
• Include laboratory safety as part of curriculum 
for undergraduate and graduate programs 
(medical  technologists, pathology residents, 
medical students)
• Education of clinical care and laboratory staff
oDifferent safety issues and PPE requirements-lab 
handles patient specimens but clinical staff directly  
handles patients
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How To Monitor, Evaluate  and Assure Continuous 
Improvement in Laboratory Safety? 2
Education of clinical care and laboratory staff (cont)
• Education of Infection Prevention personnel about:
o different PPE requirements in laboratory and
o engineering controls available and used in laboratory 
(biosafety cabinets,  splash shields and “closed” 
instrumentation) 
• Education of Laboratorians on how working with 
patients is different than working with patients’ samples
 CDC is working on training videos, work instructions 
and on-line modules for PPE, BSC, and Conducting 
Risk Assessments
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How To Monitor, Evaluate  and Assure Continuous 
Improvement in Laboratory Safety? 3
 Work with partners?
• IDSA, SHEA, ASM, APIC, HICPAC, ASCP, APHL, CAP, others? 
• Accrediting agencies 
• Federal agencies: 
o NIOSH, FDA, EPA, OSHA, others?
• Cooperative agreements
o PHL and Biosafety competencies
o Epidemiology and Laboratory 
Capacity- Overarching biosafety 
committees/biosafety officers
o Laboratory Biosafety for Ebola 
And Other Infectious Diseases
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Workforce Competencies for Public Health 
Laboratories 
 Publication – MMWR June 2015 
• Builds on previous MMWR biosafety competencies published April 
15, 2011 (Structured differently with a focus on tasks)  
 Purpose:
• Provide a comprehensive set of nationally-vetted competencies 
for Public Health Laboratories and can also be used for clinical 
laboratories 
• Serve as a foundation for a standardized system of laboratory 
workforce competencies
• Identify knowledge, skills, and abilities
• Provide several tools- to be released with the Competencies
o Focused  on Emergency Management & Response & Safety domains
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Report-Lab Acquired Infections and 
Exposures 
 Long recognized that there is no reporting system for lab 
acquired infections (LAIs)
 Trans Federal Task Force (2009) and Blue Ribbon Panel 
(2011) made recommendations to develop and implement a 
voluntary, non-punitive reporting system
• Recommendation published in MMWR January 2012
 “Report-LAI” to be used to identify safety issues and training 
gaps in order to help reduce LAIs
 “Report-LAI” is currently in HHS clearance
 How can we help in making this available for clinical 
laboratory use? 
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Joint Project of CDC, NIH, and FDA
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Glossary for Abbreviations 
 IDSA; Infectious Disease Society of America 
 SHEA;  Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America
 ASM;  American Society for Microbiology  
 APIC;  Association of Professionals in Infection Control 
 HICPAC;  CDC Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory 
Committee
 ASCP; American Society of Clinical Pathology  
 APHL;  Association of Public Health Laboratories
 CAP;  College of American Pathologists 
 NIOSH; CDC National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
 FDA;  Food and Drug Administration
 EPA;  Environmental Protection Agency 
 OSHA;  Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
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Accreditation Organizations/Exempt States Under CLIA  
 AABB; American Association of Blood Banks
 AALA; American Association for Laboratory Accreditation 
 AOA; American Osteopathic Association 
 ASHI; American Society for Histocompatibility and Immuno-
genetics 
 COLA
 CAP; College of American Pathologists 
 Joint Commission
 Exempt states; New York and Washington  
For more information please contact Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1600 Clifton Road NE,  Atlanta,  GA  30333
Telephone: 1-800-CDC-INFO (232-4636)/TTY: 1-888-232-6348
Visit: www.cdc.gov | Contact CDC at: 1-800-CDC-INFO or www.cdc.gov/info
The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
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